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DISCOVERY AND THE PRIVACY ACT: EXEMPTION (b)(l1)
TO THE CONDITIONS OF DISCLOSURE: WHAT
QUALIFIES AS AN "ORDER OF THE COURT"?
John W. Williams*
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 31, 1974, President Gerald Ford signed the
landmark Privacy Act of 19741 into law. One of the key concepts of
the Act is the principle of disclosure limitation, which limits the
ability of the federal government to disclose the contents of per-
sonal records in its possession.2 In the words of the Senate Govern-
mental Operations Committee, this principle "is designed to pre-
vent.., the wrongful disclosure and use of personal files held by
Federal agencies." s
The disclosure limitation principle, codified in paragraph (b) of
the Act, "Conditions of Disclosure," requires that the government
agency must first have a person's written consent before it can re-
lease or distribute any personal information from that person's
* Attorney, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; J.D., George
Washington University, 1980; B.A., Principia College, 1976. The views here expressed are
those of the author and do not represent the position of the Department of Justice.
1. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-183, 89
Stat. 1057.
2. See Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society,
501-02 (1977).
3. S. REP. No. 93-1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6916.
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file.4 Wrongful or unauthorized release of personal information can
result in either civil or criminal penalties against the government
official responsible. The paragraph, however, allows for a number
of exceptions to the requirement of prior written consent.6
The last exception allows the government to disclose personal
information in response to a court order.1 On the surface, this ex-
ception seems quite reasonable. First, since a court order is pre-
sumably a mandatory judicial command which the government
must either obey or risk punishment, it stands to reason that the
government should not be required to obtain prior consent before
making a release to the court. If the government was required to
obtain release consent and was unable to do so, it would risk pun-
ishment for a situation over which it had little or no control. Fur-
thermore, it should not be punished for adhering to the letter and
spirit of the law in protecting constitutionally-grounded rights. Fi-
nally, it is reasonable to expect that the courts would exercise at
least the same concern for an individual's personal privacy that the
Act requires of the executive branch.
Unfortunately, a simple definitional problem, which has yet to
be fully resolved, stands these assumptions on their heads. The
Congress, neither in the statute or in the legislative history, ade-
quately defined the meaning of "an order of a court." In particular,
the Congress failed to specifically include or exclude subpoenas in
the definition. If subpoenas are to be considered court orders for
the purposes of the Privacy Act there will be potential for a grave
undermining of the purpose of the Act.
This article will attempt to answer the question of whether a
subpoena is a court order for the purposes of the Privacy Act. If it
is a court order then the government would be required to disclose
personal information without either prior approval or minimal ju-
dicial review. This article will point out that the subpoena and the
discovery process fail to provide the safeguards found in the Act or
expected from the court. However, if a subpoena is not a court or-
der, the government can refuse to disclose personal information
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976).
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(D), (i)(1) (1976).
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(1)-(11). See note 21 infra.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11).
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until consent is obtained or a judge scrutinizes the need for the
information and issues an order. In doing so, the private vitizen, as
well as the government official who is liable for wrongful releases,
continues to receive some measure of protection.
II. PROTECTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
Congress, in enacting the Privacy Act of 1974,1 declared "the
right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by
the Constitution of the United States." Congress found that the
privacy of an individual is directly affected by the dissemination of
personal information by federal agencies,' 0 and that it was neces-
sary and proper to regulate this dissemination of information,"
The purpose of the Privacy Act "is to provide certain safeguards
for an individual against an invasion of personal privacy' 12 by per-
mitting the individual to determine what records pertaining to him
can be disseminated1 and by permitting the individual "to prevent
records pertaining to him obtained . . . for a particular purpose
from being used or made available for another purpose without his
consent." 4
In order to achieve these goals, Congress prohibited federal
agencies from disclosing any record contained in a system of
records except pursuant to the written consent of the individual to
whom the record pertains.' 5 This requirement is firm in its prohi-
bition of disclosure of personal information "by any means of com-
munication to any person, or to another agency."' As a result, fed-
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552a and provisions set out (1976). See S. REP. No. 93-1183, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1974) and H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in
SOURCEBOOK ON PRIVACY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (1976) (for sale
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402, price $12.45) [hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK ON PRIVACY].
9. Privacy Act of 1974 § 2(a)(4), 5 U.S.C. § 552a note (a)(4) (1976).
10. Id. § 2(a)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 552a note (a)(1) (1976).
11. Id. § 2(a)(5), 5 U.S.C. § 552a note (a)(5) (1976).
12. Id. § 2(b), 5 U.S.C. § 552a note b (1976).
13. Id. § 2(b)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 552a note b(1) (1976).
14. Id. § 2(b)(2), 5 U.S.C. § 552a note b(2) (1976).
15. Id. § 3(b), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976). See Zeller v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 487, 503
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); Local 2047, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Defense Gen. Supply Center,
423 F. Supp. 481, 483 (E.D. Va. 1976), af'd, 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978).
16. Privacy Act of 1974 § 3(b), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). Guidelines established by the Office of
Management and Budget indicate that "any means of communication" includes oral, writ-
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eral agencies must take steps to verify the identity of the person
seeking the information or to provide for prior written consent. For
example, the U.S. Department of Justice requires that a person es-
tablish his identity by (1) presenting, if in person, a document
bearing a photograph, such as a passport or identification badge, or
two items that bear both a name and address, such as a driver's
license or credit card; (2) providing, if by mail, a signature, ad-
dress, date of birth, place of birth, and one other identifier, such as
a photocopy of an identification card; or (3) submitting, either in
person or by mail, a notarized statement swearing to his identity
under the penalties for false statements pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1001.17 If the requesting individual is accompanied by another per-
son, both are required to sign a form indicating that the Justice
Department is authorized to discuss the personal information in
the presence of the accompanying individual."5 Certain information
is even more carefully protected, such as FBI identification records
or "rap sheets."1 A request for a rap sheet must be accompanied
by the requester's name, date and place of birth and a set of
"rolled-inked" fingerprint impressions on standardized cards.20
III. EXCEPTION (b)(11)
The Privacy Act prohibits the federal government from disclos-
ing personal records unless certain conditions are met, but Con-
gress has provided for eleven exceptions to those conditions. 21 To-
ten and electronic or mechanical transfers between computers. Privacy Act Implementa-
tion: Guidelines and Responsibilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948 (1975) [hereinafter cited as OMB
Guidelines].
17. 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.41(b)(1)-.41(b)(3). For citations to the regulations promulgated by va-
rious federal agencies, see C. MARWICK, THE 1980 EDITION OF LITIGATION UNDER THE FED-
ERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT AND PRIVACY AcT 168-70 app. (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as LITGATION MANUAL].
18. 28 C.F.R. § 16.41(d) (1980).
19. FBI identification records or "rap sheets" are listings of fingerprints submitted to the
FBI by other agencies or institutions in connection with arrests, employment, naturalization
or military service. 28 C.F.R. § 16.31 (1980).
20. 28 C.F.R. § 16.32 (1980).
21. Privacy Act of 1974 § 3(b), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976) lists the conditions and excep-
tions as follows:
No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by
any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to
a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the
record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be-
442 [Vol. 15:439
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gether, these exemptions allow the federal government to
disseminate information so long as any disclosures under the ex-
ceptions are "appropriate and consistent with the letter and intent
of the Act and [the Office of Management and Budget]
guidelines.122
"The listed circumstances are broad enough to allow disclosure
in almost all situations where there is a legitimate need for disclo-
sure;" 3 however, disclosure is permissive, not mandatory.2 ' The
OMB guidelines clearly direct that "nothing in the privacy act (sic)
should be interpreted to authorize or compel disclosure of records,
not otherwise permitted or required, to anyone other than the indi-
(1) to those officers and employees of the agency which maintains the record
who have a need for the record in the performance of their duties;
(2) required under section 552 of this title;
(3) for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this section and described
under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section;
(4) to the Bureau of the Census for purposes of planning or carrying out a cen-
sus or survey or related activity pursuant to the provisions of title 13;
(5) to a recipient who has provided the agency with advance adequate written
assurance that the record will be used solely as a statistical research or reporting
record, and the record is to be transferred in a form that is not individually
identifiable;
(6) to the National Archives of the United States as a record which has suffi-
cient historical or other value to warrant its continued preservation by the United
States Government, or for evaluation by the Administrator of General Services or
his designee to determine whether the record has such value;
(7) to another agency or to an instrumentality of any governmental jurisdiction
within or under the control of the United States for a civil or criminal law enforce-
ment activity if the activity is authorized by law, and if the head of the agency or
instrumentality has made a written request to the agency which maintains the rec-
ord specifying the particular portion desired and the law enforcement activity for
which the record is sought;
(8) to a person pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affecting the
health or safety of an individual if upon such disclosure notification is transmitted
to the last known address of such individual;
(9) to either House of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within its jurisdic-
tion, any committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of Congress or
subcommittee of any such joint committee;
(10) to the Comptroller General, or any of his authorized representatives, in the
course of the performance of the duties of the General Accounting Office; or
(11) pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
22. OMB Guidelines, supra note 16, at 28,953.
23. Note, The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview, 1976 DuKE L.J. 301, 311 (1976). The
author continues: "Indeed, one may question whether the consent provision provides a real
limitation upon agency activity." Id.
24. OMB Guidelines, supra note 16, at 28,953.
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vidual to whom a record pertains pursuant to a request by the in-
dividual for access to it." 2 5
The eleventh exception, (b)(11), permits disclosure without con-
sent of the subject of the information pursuant to an order of a
court of competent jurisdiction.26 This clause has been noted by
commentators as one of the two or three "controversial"27 or
"questionable" 2 exceptions. These concerns arise in part because
of the sparse language of the (b)(11) exception. The final text of
the clause deleted a provision which would have given advance no-
tice to individuals in order that those persons would have been
able to seek legal relief from the demand for records in advance of
their dissemination.2 The Senate proposal of exception (b)(11) in-
cluded an advance notice provision which provided that every fed-
eral agency covered by the Privacy Act was required to make rea-
sonable efforts to serve advance notice on an individual before any
personal information was made available to any person under com-
pulsory legal process. 0 According to the Senate Report, the pur-
pose of the section was to permit an individual advance notice so
that he could take appropriate legal steps to suppress a subpoena
for his personal data.3 1 Such a provision is more attractive than the
provision adopted because it affords greater protection to the sub-
25. Id.
26. Kelly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., No. 79-0547 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1980). See also
Weahkee v. Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1082 (10th Cir. 1980), which reads:
Weahkee [plaintiff employee in this employment discrimination action] next argues
that the trial court committed reversible error in denying a motion to compel discov-
ery of EEOC personnel files [of other employees] Weahkee claims he should have
received. The EEOC objected to Weahkee's request for discovery because the Privacy
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11), prohibits release of personnel files without a court order.
This objection, however, does not state a claim of privilege; a court order is merely
one of the "conditions of disclosure." Id. § 552a(b) (heading). A court order under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 in response to Weahkee's motion to compel discovery would meet
the standards of that Act.
27. 2 J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: PROCEDURES, FORMS, AND THE LAw §
21.05, at 21-12 (1980).
28. Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REv. 971,
1326 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Project].
29. J. O'REMLLY, supra note 27, at 21-12 to -13.
30. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(g) (1974), reprinted in SouRCEBOOK ON PRIVACY,
supra note 8, at 97.
31. SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN FEDERAL
GATHERING, USE AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION, S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 66
(1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 151, 219.
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ject's privacy interests by permitting him to take appropriate legal
steps to suppress a subpoena without unduly burdening the re-
quester, who would already be in court.2 The final text of the
clause deleted the advance notice required and the legislative his-
tory of the Privacy Act offers no clue as to why this subsection was
not adopted. In fact, the legislative history of exception (b)(11) is
itself very sparse.33 The only discussion of the exception appears in
a brief floor debate in the House of Representatives. The entire
debate reads:
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BUTLER
Mr. Butler. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Butler: Page 23, after line 25, in-
sert the following: "(9) pursuant to the order of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction."
Mr. Butler. Mr. Chairman, this is an amendment to the section of
the bill dealing with conditions of disclosure. It is introduced for the
purpose of making it perfectly clear that a lawful order of a court of
competent jurisdiction would be an appropriate condition of
disclosure.
Mr. Moorhead of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlemen
yield?
Mr. Butler. I yield to the gentlemen from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Moorhead of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has
discussed his amendment with us, and we find no objection to the
amendment.
The Chairman pro tempore. The question is on the amendment
offered by the gentlemen from Virginia (Mr. Butler).
The amendment was agreed to.u
What is not "perfectly clear," to use Congressman Butler's
phrase, is what exactly would satisfy the requirement of an "order
of the court." This question of interpretation arises whenever the
federal government is served with a civil or criminal subpoena as
32. Project, supra note 28, at 1326.
33. See Bruce v. United States, 621 F.2d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 1980).
34. 120 CONG. REC. 36954 (1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK ON PfiVACY, supra note 8, at
936.
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part of discovery proceedings in any case to which the government
may or may not be a party. The central question is whether or not
a subpoena is an "order of the court" for the purposes of (b)(11). 5
If the subpoena is not an order, the government is estopped from
providing any information protected by the Privacy Act. The pro-
hibition of the Act is absolute and the government is without any
release discretion.86 If a subpoena is an order, the information that
is sought loses its highly protected status. The government then
has the discretion to provide without the subject's consent, or re-
fuse to provide, the information that is sought. A refusal to supply
the information would necessitate a challenge to the subpoena on
grounds other than the Privacy Act, and the risk of being held in
contempt of the court.
This dilemma was addressed in the case of Stiles v. Atlanta Gas
Light Co.3 7 The district court, in an action under the Veterans' Re-
employment Rights Act, held that the Privacy Act prevented dis-
closure of the subpoenaed documents in the custody of the Labor-
Management Services Administration, a branch of the U.S. De-
partment of Labor. The defendant's subpoena duces tecum was
quashed because it fell outside the definition of exception (b)(11).
The sparseness of the court's rationale has curious results, as the
court noted:
Defendant also argues that the exception permitting disclosure of
a record "pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction"
is applicable in the instant action. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11). It asserts
that the subpoena issued here is such an order of the court. Again,
however, the court must disagree. Section 552a(b)(11) provides for
those cases in which, for compelling reasons, the court specifically
directs that a record be disclosed. Mere issuance in discovery pro-
ceedings of a subpoena-which is always subject to the power of the
court to quash or limit-does not meet this standard. To so hold
35. Exception (b)(11), clearly, does not prevent discovery. United States v. Brown, 562
F.2d 1144, 1152 (9th Cir. 1978); Christy v. United States, 68 F.R.D. 375, 378 (N.D. Tex.
1975). In both cases, prison records were found to be discoverable under the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), and not protected, in the face of a court order under
(b)(11), by the Privacy Act. In Clavir v. United States, 84 F.R.D. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
the court held that (b)(11) could not block "court-ordered discovery."
36. Privacy Act of 1974 § 3(b), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976).
37. 453 F. Supp. 798 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
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would permit precisely the type of privacy invasions the Act sought
to prevent.
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the Privacy Act will pre-
vent disclosure in this case of the subpoenaed documents unless the
court specifically orders them produced pursuant to section
552a(b)(11)."
While the court disagreed with the defendant's contention that a
subpoena is an order of the court, it did not clearly adopt the op-
posite stand. The Stiles case seemed to adopt the definition, for
the purpose of exception (b)(11), that a (b)(11) order comes into
being when "the court specifically directs that a record be dis-
closed."3 9 The court also adopted a standard of "compelling rea-
son," although the source of its interpretation of exemption (b)(11)
and its standard is not revealed. The court only stated that its
holding is in accord with the purposes of the Privacy Act.40
To help resolve the dilemma not clearly settled by Stiles, we
must ask what Congress intended by the phrase "order of the
court." Did the Congress intend to include or exclude subpoenas,
or other discovery devices, from the scope of exception (b)(11)?
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
What did Congress intend with exception (b)(11)? It has been
noted that
[a]t least one court [in the Stiles case] has concluded that a sub-
poena is not an "order of a court" within the meaning of exception
11, holding that the provision requires a specific court order di-
recting disclosure. There is nothing in the legislative history of the
Privacy Act of 1974 to suggest what Congress intended by the
term.
41
Indeed, as indicated earlier, the legislative history of the entire ex-
38. Id. at 800 (citation omitted).
39. Id. (emphasis in original).
40. Id.
41. Bruce v. United States, 621 F.2d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 1980) (citation and footnote
omitted).
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ception is nonexistent.42 On November 21, 1974, Congressman But-
ler rose on the floor of the House of Representatives to offer a ten
word addition to the House of Representatives bill number 16373
which would become the Privacy Act of 1974. The proposed
amendment had been discussed earlier with Congressman Moor-
head, chairman of the subcommittee sponsoring the bill. The pro-
posal was adopted without objection or debate43 and became clause
(b)(9) of the Privacy Act.44 The House adopted the bill by a roll
call vote of 353 to 1, with 80 members not voting.45
On December 11, the House voted to replace the Senate version,
S. 3418,46 with H.R. 16373. Six days later, Senator Sam Ervin pro-
posed Senate acceptance of the House substitution text of H.R.
16373 for S. 3418,'47 with exception (b)(9) remaining intact.48 A
very brief floor discussion ensued in which two further exceptions
were added, and (b)(9) was renumbered as (b)(11).41 No discussion
of (b)(11) took place at this point or in subsequent debates.
The only legislative history remotely related to (b)(11) was sub-
section 201(g) of the earliest Senate bill.5 0 This clause was designed
to give advance notice of the release information to the individual
to whom it pertained so that he could take legal steps to suppress
42. The present exception 11 was not included in either the Senate or House Bills and is,
therefore, not discussed in the Senate and House Reports. There was no Conference Report.
See S. Rep. No. 93-1183, accompanying S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974]
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 6916; H.R. Rep. No. 93-1416, accompanying H.R.
16373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The first reference to the provision in congressional de-
bate is in a recitation of the House bill in the Senate on December 17, 1974. 120 Cong. Rec.
§ 40,398 (1974). However, there is no discussion of the provision either on that date or in
subsequent debates on the House and Senate Bills. Id. at 916 n.4.
43. See 120 CONG. REC. 36959 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Butler).
44. H.R. REP. No. 16373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 27(b)(9) (1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK
ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 437, 442.
45. 120 CONG. REc. 36976 (1974), reprinted in SOURCEooK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at
981.
46. S. 3418 provided for "an act to establish a Privacy Protection Commission, to provide
management systems in Federal agencies and certain other organizations with respect to the
gathering of information concerning individuals, and for other purposes." Id. at 984-85.
47. 120 CONG. REC. 40398 (1974).
48. 120 CONG. REc. 6741 (1974).
49. 120 CONG. REc. 36917 (1974).
50. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(g) (1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK ON PRIVAcY,
supra note 8, at 97.
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a subpoena.51 The framers did not intend the clause to require
compulsory legal process where it was not required,5 2 nor did they
intend it to loosen any restrictions whereby information could only
be obtained through court order or other legal process.53 The pro-
vision was intended
to be a separate safeguard independent of any other exemption in
the Act in order to carry out the principle that an individual should
be on notice whenever any agency official is under judicial compul-
sion to surrender data, and... to allow the individual to exercise
any existing rights under Federal and State laws and regulations to
challenge the issuance of administrative or judicial orders."
This subsection and the principle of prior notification were not in-
cluded in either the House or the final version of the proposed leg-
islation. As noted previously, this failure has not gone unnoticed or
uncriticized by commentators. 5 The House and Senate appear to
have recognized this oversight as the final legislation does require
that an agency "make reasonable efforts to serve notice on an indi-
vidual when any record on such individual is made available to any
person under compulsory legal process when such process becomes
a matter of public record. '55 This subsection adopts the principle
of notice, albeit not prior notice. In fact, because the Act allows the
government to withhold notification so long as the legal process
which compelled the disclosure has not become public, the subject
of the information might never be notified. This removes, in a
number of instances, any opportunity to challenge the compulsory
legal process. This result seems to contradict the Perlman deci-
sion57 and its progeny which allow the subject of the disclosed in-
formation a privilege to challenge the disclosure order.
The situation is complicated when (b)(11) actions are recorded
pursuant to the Privacy Act accounting requirements. 58 The Act
51. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
52. See note 31 supra, at 67, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 220.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See J. O'REILLY, supra note 27; Project, supra note 28.
56. Privacy Act of 1974 § 3(e)(8), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(8) (1976).
57. See text accompanying notes 157 & 158 infra.
58. Privacy Act of 1974 § 3(c), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c) (1976).
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requires each agency to keep an accurate accounting of the date,
nature, and purpose of each disclosure and the name and address
of the person or agency to whom the disclosure is made.5 9 This
accounting is required to be retained for five years or for the life of
the record, whichever is longer.60 Furthermore, particularly with
respect to (b)(11), the agency must make the accounting available
to the individual named in the record at his request.0 1 At an ex-
treme, it is possible for a person to write for and receive an ac-
counting of agency disclosures made under (b)(11) while being un-
able to challenge those disclosures.
To compound the confusion, the Privacy Act allows certain fed-
eral agencies to exempt themselves from some of the requirements
of the Act.6 2 Under the Act, the Central Intelligence Agency 3 and
any agency whose principal function pertains to the enforcement of
criminal laws" can exempt itself from the requirements of subsec-
tion (c)(3) (disclosure of accounting) and subsection (e)(8) (notifi-
cation of court-ordered disclosure).6 5 These agencies, however, can-
not remove themselves from the requirements of subsection (b)(11)
(obtaining a court order) or subsection (c)(1) (accounting). On the
other hand, law enforcement agencies other than those enforcing
criminal laws6 can not exempt themselves from the requirements
of subsection (e)(8) (notification of court ordered disclosure).6
Thus, the dilemma posed by (c)(3) (disclosure of accounting) can
be resolved by exempting the agency from its requirements.
If an agency has exempted itself to the full extent allowable
under the Privacy Act, it is entirely possible that the person about
whom information is sought will never know of its release by the
agency under court order. If the subpoena is to be accepted as the
requisite court order, it is very likely that no judge will intervene
in the disclosure. As a result, the citizen loses all possible safe-
59. Id. § 3(c)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(1) (1976).
60. Id. § 3(c)(2), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(2) (1976).
61. Id. § 3(c)(3), 5 U.S.C. 8 552a(c)(3) (1976).
62. Id. §§ 30), (k), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(j), (k) (1976).
63. Id. § 3(j)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1) (1976).
64. Id. § 3(j)(2), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2) (1976).
65. Id. § 3(j), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (1976).
66. Id. § 3(k)(2), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2) (1976).
67. Id. § 3(k), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) (1976).
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guards. One cannot challenge an unknown release. Even if one
later learns about a release of privileged information, the agency
has been freed from liability, and thus loses all interest in chal-
lenging the subpoena. The citizen cannot even turn to the courts as
the disclosure would have already taken place. There is no effective
judicial buffer to a release in response to a subpoena. The end re-
sult could be the loss of all privacy protection intended by the Act.
The law recognizes that even though some records, such as
records of past criminal activity and prison records, are private,
disclosure may be warranted by the public interest.6 8 It has been
noted that in such cases the public's right to know exceeds the ac-
cused's interest in privacy, at least as to identification and details
of background. In these cases, it can be argued that the criminal
waives his right to remain protected by societal privacy interests,
particularly where the past fact sought to be discovered is precisely
relevant to the present criminal activity.69 However, if the sub-
poena is accepted as a court order, as in the scenario portrayed
above, the conflict between privacy rights and public interest can-
not even be addressed prior to the release of the information. This
contradicts the Privacy Act's expressed purpose of promoting gov-
ernmental respect for the privacy of citizens7
The interplay of FOIA and the Privacy Act permits an individual
whose privacy is at stake to insist that a neutral magistrate superin-
tend and permit disclosure of private matters only to the extent
which valid public interests require. Disclosures made pursuant to
court order are then exempt from [the Act].71
The issuance of a subpoena provides no opportunity to measure or
challenge the validity of the public interest. This was illustrated in
Bruce v. United States72 where a subpoena was issued by the
Clerk of the Criminal District Courts of Dallas County, apparently
at the request of the state prosecutor. Although the subpoena or-
68. Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp. 778, 785 (D.R.I. 1978).
69. J. O'REILLY, supra note 27, at 16-14 to -15. See FED. R. CriM. P. 16(a)(1)(B); FED. R.
EVID. 405(b); J. O'REILLY, supra note 27, at § 16.05 and accompanying footnotes.
70. S. REP. No. 93-1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6916.
71. Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp. 762, 767-68 n.9 (D.R.I. 1978).
72. 621 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1980).
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dered release of the records directly to the presiding judge, there
was no affirmative order of disclosure on the part of the court nor
any other prior judicial approval.78 The court stated,"[f]or pur-
poses of this appeal only, we assume, but do not decide, that the
subpoena was not an 'order of a court' within the meaning of ex-
ception 11."'' 4
"[E]xception (11) to § 552a(b) makes it completely clear that the
Act cannot be used to block the normal course of court proceed-
ings, including court-ordered discovery. '75 To balance the right of
privacy under the Act with the public interest in disclosure, espe-
cially in releasing criminal records, the courts have taken the af-
firmative step of issuing a specific order directing release of
records .7
V. EXCEPTION (b)(11) IN PRACTICE
Not only did exception (b)(11) generate little legislative history,
it has produced very little case law. Stiles v. Atlanta Gas Light
Company77 remains the leading case. Based on Stiles and United
States v. Brown, 8 the U.S. Department of Justice takes the posi-
tion that the mere issuance of a subpoena in discovery proceedings
does not meet the standard of (b)(11). 7 9 The Department's guide-
73. Id. at 916 n.5.
74. Id. at 916.
75. Clavir v. United States, 84 F.R.D. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See United States v.
Brown, 562 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1978).
76. Christy v. United States, 68 F.R.D. 375 (N.D. Tex. 1975). See also Weahkee v. Nor-
ton, 621 F.2d 1080 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1978).
77. 453 F. Supp. 798 (N.D. Ga. 1978). For a discussion of the Stiles case, see text begin-
ning at note 37 supra.
78. 359 U.S. 41 (1959). The Brown case is discussed in the text beginning at note 122
infra.
79. Privacy Act-Discovery Proceedings, 28 U.S. ATrORNEYs' BuLL. No. 21 at 702 (October
10, 1980). The entire passage reads:
Privacy Act-Discovery Proceedings
Assistant U.S. Attorneys are reminded that the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a)
provides that "no agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of
records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except
pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual
to whom the record pertains. . . ." except in certain situations. 5 U.S.C. 552a(b). The
last of those certain situations enumerated in the Act, (b)(11), permits disclosure of a
record "pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction." Please note that
it is the Department's policy that the mere issuance in discovery proceedings of a
[Vol. 15:439
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lines for the United States attorneys directly parallels Stiles and
states that "the court must specifically direct that the specific
records in question be disclosed."80 An order issued in Segar v.
Bell is an example of a court's "specific direction."81
It is clear from the case law that federal district courts can be
"courts of competent jurisdiction" and can order disclosure pursu-
ant to exception (b)(11). 8 2 Although not clarified by federal case
law, state and municipal courts can serve as courts of competent
subpoena, which is always subject to the power of the court to quash or limit, does
not meet the standard of (b)(11). In order to come within the Privacy Act exception
permitting disclosure the court must specifically direct that the specific records in
question be disclosed. See United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1978) and
Stiles v. Atlanta Gas Light Company, 453 F. Supp. 798 (1978).
80. Privacy Act-Discovery Proceedings, supra note 79, at 702.
81. Segar v. Bell, No. 77-0081 (D.D.C. July 28, 1978) (order pursuant to Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11)). The order, in its entirety reads:
ORDER
Upon consideration of the motion of defendants, and the entire record herein, it is
by the Court, pursuant to its authority under the Privacy Act of 1974, including that
provision found at 5 U.S. Code § 552a(b)(11), hereby
ORDERED that agents, employees and officers of Criterion Analysis, Inc. shall be
permitted to have access to all documents and records maintained by the Drug En-
forcement Administration and by the Department of Justice, including those records
identifying or relating to any individual or individuals for the purposes of performing
an expert statistical analysis of the personnel patterns and practices of DEA as they
relate to hiring, training, promotion and discipline. And it is
FURTHER ORDERED by the Court that officers, agents and employees of Crite-
rion Analysis, Inc. shall keep confidential all information coming into their possession
or to their attention and shall return any such information to the Drug Enforcement
Administration or to the Department of Justice at the conclusion of this suit, or shall
destroy such information. And it is
FURTHER ORDERED that any information relating to individuals or any infor-
mation coming into existence as a result of their analysis may be communicated to
attorneys for defendants. And it is
FURTHER ORDERED that statistical analysis and information relating to the
statistics of the Drug Enforcement Administration, in the areas described above, may
be made part of the record of this case or otherwise made public, provided however
that no statistics or other information relating to the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion in the areas described above shall be made part of the record of this case or
otherwise made public if they will result in the identification of a specific individual.
DATED this 28th day of July, 1978:
82. Kelly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., No. 79 Civ. 9547 (HFW) NP 723 (S.D.N.Y. July
17, 1980). See also Weahkee v. Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1082 (10th Cir. 1980); Bruce v.
United States, 621 F.2d 914, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144,
1152 (9th Cir. 1978).
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jurisdiction for purposes of exception (b)(11), s1 as can courts of
limited jurisdiction, such as U.S. Courts of Military Appeals.8
Stiles has been relied upon to varying degrees in subsequent
case law dealing with exception (b)(11). The first discussion of
Stiles to appear in subsequent case law is found in Bruce v. United
States.85 The Eighth Circuit "assumed," in a very narrow decision,
specifically limited to the facts, that a subpoena was not an order
of a court within the meaning of exception (b)(11), but refused to
issue any decision on this point. The court indicates that prior to
the Stiles decision, several federal agencies, including the Depart-
ment of Defense and the General Services Administration, felt that
a subpoena was equivalent to an order.86 However, the court recog-
nized that federal regulations implementing the Privacy Act would
change in response to Stiles. 7
83. Marchiondo v. Traub, No. 12,740 (N.M., Nov. 14, 1979) (per curiam). The Supreme
Court of New Mexico declared that "a State court is a 'court of competent jurisdiction' as
that term is used within the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1974 ......
Id. See also, Saulter v. Municipal Ct. for Oakland-Piedmont Judicial Dist., 75 Cal. App. 3d
231, 245-46, 142 Cal. Rptr. 266, 275 (1977).
84. United States v. Credit, 2 M.J. 631 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 4 M.J.
118 (C.M.A. 1977), on remand, 6 M.J. 719 (A.F.C.M.R. 1978).
85. 621 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1980).
86. Id. at 917. The court summarized this inference by noting:
The rules promulgated by the DOD under the Act indicate that the Department
equates a subpoena with an order of a court.
[Records may not be disclosed without prior written consent unless disclosure will
be]
(11) Pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
(i) When a record is disclosed under compulsory legal process and when the
issuance of that order of subpoena is made public by the court which issued it,
make reasonable efforts to notify the individual to whom the record pertains. 32
C.F.R. § 286a.8(b) (emphasis added).
In addition, GSA's own regulations in effect at the time of release in this case
provided that records could be released to a state or county court for use in a crimi-
nal prosecution "upon receipt of a proper court order or subpoena," subject to cer-
tain exceptions not applicable in the present case. General Services Administration,
Release and Access Guide for Military Personnel and Related Records at the Na-
tional Personnel Records Center, NPRC 1865.16 (Dec. 29, 1972).
Id. at 917 n.7.
87. The present Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines for the use of fed-
eral agencies in implementing the Privacy Act merely repeat the language of excep-
tion 11 without elaboration. Office of Management and Budget, Privacy Act Imple-
mentation: Guidelines and Responsibilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 28948, 28955 (1975). The
government advises, however, that OMB is in the process of developing a new guide-
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The cases of In re Vaughn"8 and Metadure Corp. v. United
States'9 also refer to Stiles. Although the case of Weahkee v. Nor-
tone" does not refer specifically to Stiles, the court held that a
court order under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
would meet the standards of (b)(11). 1
The Stiles decision in turn made reference to United States v.
Brown,9 2 which indicated that (b)(11) could not prevent discovery.
The Brown decision referred to Christy v. United States,93 which
was decided before the Privacy Act took effect. The Christy court,
nevertheless, spoke to the proposed (b)(11) exception, holding that
(b)(11) could not preclude discovery of the criminal record of a
prison inmate. Recognizing that (b)(11) prohibited disclosure of
personal data unless pursuant to a court order, the Christy court
issued such an order.94 The Christy court found that the informa-
tion sought was discoverable under Rule 405(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 5 This would imply the government would not
lose any of its privileges against discovery under (b)(11). The court
also indicated that the possible injury to the subject was remote
and that the court would "forestall any misuse of the information
with the prophylaxis available under Rule 26(c)."
VI. WHAT IS A SUBPOENA?
Some American courts have considered a subpoena to be an or-
der of the court.9 In one case, In re Simon,9 the bankrupt, Simon,
had been held in contempt for failing to appear before a referee in
line to implement the Stiles decision.
621 F.2d at 917 n.8.
88. 496 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
89. 490 F. Supp. 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
90. 621 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1980).
91. Id.
92. 562 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1978).
93. 68 F.R.D. 375 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
94. Id.
95. Rule 405(b) states that "[i]n cases in which character or a trait of character of a per-
son is an essential element of a ... claim ... proof may also be made of specific instances
of his conduct." FED. R. EviD. 405(b).
96. 68 F.R.D. 375 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
97. In re Simon, 297 F. 942, 944 (2d Cir. 1924); Holbrook v. Cafiero, 18 F.R.D. 218, 219
(D. Md. 1955); Leas & McVitty v. Merriman, 132 F. 510, 513 (W.D. Va. 1904).
98. 297 F. 942, 944 (2d Cir. 1924).
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bankruptcy under a writ of subpoena. Simon's counsel questioned
whether a subpoena fell within section 6b of the Bankruptcy Act,
which provided "that the court might discharge bankruptcy unless
'in the course of the proceedings in bankruptcy [he had] refused to
obey any lawful order of, or to answer any material question ap-
proved by the court.' "9 Counsel argued that a subpoena could not
be termed an order of the court as the word "order," contained in
the statute, must be interpreted in the sense in which it is usually
employed. Counsel further argued that it had not seen it employed
to include a subpoena.100 The court responded by finding that a
subpoena is a writ, that a writ is a mandatory precept issued by a
court, and that because it is mandatory, and is issued by a court, it
is an order of the court.101
The Simon court did acknowledge that a subpoena is not actu-
ally issued by a judge:
The fact that a writ of subpoena is actually signed in writing by
the clerk of the court, and does not contain the written signature of
the judge of the court, makes it none the less the court's order. The
signature of the judge is printed in the concluding clause, which con-
stitutes the test of the writ. It is there in attestation of the fact that
the writ is issued by authority.
The subpoena, issued under the seal of the court, and bearing the
test of the judge, and signed by the clerk, is "the order of the judge"
or of the court referred to in the passage above quoted .... By vir-
tue of the authority thus granted, the District Court, not the clerk,
is empowered to issue its writ of subpoena, and when issued its com-
mand is that of the court, not that of the clerk. A clerk is an officer
of the court, whose duties are chiefly ministerial, and who is without
authority to exercise judicial powers wihout constitutional or statu-
tory authorization. 10 2
The pro forma nature of the subpoena, as acknowledged in Si-
mon, has been codified in the Federal Rules of Criminal 0 3 and
99. Id. at 943 (citing Bankruptcy Act § 14b(6) (1910)).
100. 297 F. at 943.
101. Id. at 944.
102. Id. at 944-45.
103. 18 U.S.C. (1976).
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Civil10 4 Procedure. Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure describes a subpoena:
A subpoena shall be issued by the clerk under the seal of the
court. It shall state the name of the court and the title, if any, of the
proceeding, and shall command each person to whom it is directed
to attend and give testimony at the time and place specified therein.
The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed and sealed but otherwise in
blank to a party requesting it, who shall fill in the blanks before it is
served. A subpoena shall be issued by a United States magistrate in
a proceeding before him, but it need not be under the seal of the
court.
10 5
The Advisory Committee notes on this subdivision indicate: "[t]his
rule is substantially the same as Rule 45(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,"10 which reads:
Every subpoena shall be issued by the clerk under the seal of the
court, shall state the name of the court and the title of the action,
and shall command each person to whom it is directed to attend and
give testimony at a time and place therein specified. The clerk shall
issue a subpoena, or a subpoena for the production of documentary
evidence, signed and sealed but otherwise in blank, to a party re-
questing it, who shall fill it in before service.11 7
Subpoenas, by definition, are standardized, blank forms, that are
distributed by the clerk of the court prior to the completion of the
form.
The use of subpoenas under the Federal Rules is broad. For ex-
ample, Civil Rule 26 specifically states that there are no limits on
the frequency of use of the discovery tools.108 This rule also sets
104. 28 U.S.C. (1976).
105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a).
106. FEDERAL RULEs (Crim. Proc.) 53 (West 1979).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a).
108. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods: depositions
upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of
documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspec-
tion and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for admis-
sion. Unless the court orders otherwise under subdivision (c) of this rule, the fre-
quency of use of these methods is not limited.
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forth the scope of discovery, 109 as does Rule 34 with regard to sub-
poenas duces tecum.110 The Criminal Rules allow discovery into
statements made by the defendant,"" the defendant's prior rec-
ord,112 various documents and tangible objects,1" 3 and reports of
examinations and tests." 4 A subpoena duces tecum, especially in a
civil matter, may be served upon the plaintiff without leave of
court after commencement of the action and upon any other party
with or after service of the summons and complaint upon that
FED. R. Cxv. P. 26(a).
109. Rule 26 reads, in part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of
any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of per-
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that
the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought ap-
pears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
110. Rule 34 reads, in part:
Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and permit the
party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy, any
designated documents (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs,
phono-records, and other data compilations from which information can be obtained,
translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into reasonably
usable form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things which consti-
tute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the posses-
sion, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served.
FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
111. FED. R. CRiM. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
112. FED. R. CalM. P. 16(a)(1)(B).
113. See FED. R. CraM. P. 16(a)(1)(C), which reads:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to in-
spect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible ob-
jects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the posses-
sion, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the preparation
of his defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the
trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
and, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A), which reads:
If the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule,
upon compliance with such request by the government, the defendant, on request of
the government, shall permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph
books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, or copies or portions
thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the defendant and
which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at the trial.
114. FED. R. CraM. P. 16(a)(1)(D), (b)(1)(B).
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party. 5 "This rule does not preclude an independent action
against a person not a party for production of documents and
things. ... "I' Because of the latitude allowed under the Rules,
there has been abuse of discovery. In reviewing the Civil Rules, the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference dis-
cussed the widespread criticism of abuse of discovery and consid-
ered a number of proposals to eliminate abuse, including a change
in Rule 26(b)(1) with respect to the scope of discovery and a
change in Rule 33(a) to limit the number of questions that can be
asked by interrogatories to parties.117
American courts have recognized that discovery by subpoena has
two stages; the issuance of the subpoena, and its enforcement. The
bipartite nature of the subpoena was reaffirmed when Richard
Nixon attempted to challenge the grand jury subpoena duces teo-
cum for a number of White House tape recordings. The court
noted that United States v. Burr s recognized a distinction be-
tween the issuance of a subpoena and the ordering of compliance
with that subpoena, but that the distinction did not concern judi-
cial power or jurisdiction. A subpoena duces tecum is an order to
produce documents or to show cause why they need not be pro-
duced. An order to comply does not make the subpoena more com-
pulsory; it simply maintains its original force.11 9 In a more recent
case1 20 pertaining to an exception in the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) 121 which is analagous to exemption (b)(11), the Supreme
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
116. FED. R. Cwv. P. 34(c).
117. FEDERAL RuLEs (Civ. Proc.) app. 5 (West 1979) (Revised Preliminary Draft of Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). The Advisory Committee went
on to state:
The Committee believes that abuse of discovery, while very serious in certain cases,
is not so general as to require such basic changes in the rules that govern discovery in
all cases. A very recent study of discovery in selected metropolitan districts tends to
support its belief. P. Connolly, E. Holleman, & M. Kuhlman, Judicial Controls and
the Civil Litigative Process: Discovery (Federal Judicial Center, 1978). In the judg-
ment of the Committee abuse can best be prevented by intervention by the court as
soon as abuse is threatened.
118. 25 F. Cas. 30 (1807) (Case No. 14,692d).
119. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 709-10 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
120. In re Vaughn, 496 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
121. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FCRA]
is designed "to insure ... a respect for the consumer's right to privacy." Id. § 1681(a)(4). As
noted, a FRCA exception parallels exemption (b)(11):
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Court's decision in Brown v. United States12 2 was cited in support
of the proposition that there is a functional distinction between
the issuance of a subpoena and an order for its enforcement.
A grand jury is clothed with great independence in many areas,
but it remains an appendage of the court, powerless to perform its
investigative function without the court's aid, because powerless it-
self to compel the testimony of witnesses. It is the court's process
which summons the witness to attend and give testimony, and it is
the court which must compel a witness to testify if, after appearing,
he refuses to do so.
When the petitioner first refused to answer the grand jury's ques-
tions, he was guilty of no contempt. He was entitled to persist in his
refusal until the court ordered him to answer. Unless, therefore, it
was to be frustrated in its investigative purpose, the grand jury had
to do exactly what it did-turn to the court for help. If the court
had ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination had been
properly invoked, that would have been the end of the matter. Even
after an adverse ruling upon his claim of privilege, the petitioner
was still guilty of no contempt. It was incumbent upon the court
unequivocally to order the petitioner to answer. The court did so.
When upon his return to the grand jury room the petitioner again
refused to answer the grand jury's questions, now in direct disobedi-
ence of the court's order, he was for the first time guilty of
contempt. 2 '
Litigation involving FCRA exception 1681b(1) is instructive
when attempting to divine the meaning of "order of a court." This
clause is applicable to any requester of consumer reports under the
FCRA, including government agencies, such as the Internal Reve-
15 U.S.C. § 1681b 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)
Permissible purposes of Conditions of Disclosure
consumer reports
(1) In response to the order (11) Pursuant to the order
of a court having jurisdiction of a court of competent
to issue such an order. jurisdiction.
For more information about the FCRA, see 116 CONG. REC. 35941 (1970) (remarks of Sen.
Proxmire); Foer, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Consumer Reports, 61 A.B.A.J.
857 (1975).
122. 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
123. In re Vaughn, 496 F. Supp. at 1082 (citing Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. at 49-
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nue Service. A government agency that seeks a report from a con-
sumer reporting agency must first obtain a court order or comply
with one of the other exceptions under 1681b.124 Only the Federal
Trade Commission, because of its special statutory power incident
to its rule as the enforcer of the FCRA, is exempt from the require-
ments of exception 1681b(1). 12 5
In 1978, within a period of five weeks, two district court opinions
were issued directly contradicting each other on the meaning of
"order of a court" under the FCRA. In In re Credit Information
Corp.,1 26 the court quashed a grand jury subpoena, holding that it
was not an order of the court. The court reasoned:
In view of the grand jury's essentially investigatory and
prosecutorial function, the Court believes it would ignore reality to
consider a grand jury subpoena an order of the court. The Court
also believes that such a characterization would be inconsistent with
the function Congress intended a court order to serve under the Act,
i.e., to ensure that a consumer's privacy is not unduly impinged
upon by disclosure of his credit file to third-parties, including gov-
ernmental investigative agencies, which are not seeking the informa-
tion for credit-related, business purposes. In order to provide this
protection for the consumer, it is necessary for a court to consider
the purposes for which disclosure is sought and to make a reasoned
determination as to whether granting the requesting party access to
the consumer's ifie for such purposes would violate the consumer's
rights. Because a grand jury subpoena, like that of a governmental
administrative agency, is issued without any judicial consideration,
but rather pro forma by the clerk of the court at the request of and
for the purposes of the prosecutor, it does not provide the protection
for consumer privacy which Congress sought when it required a
court order under § 1681b.117
A month later, the court in In re TRW, Inc.128 reached the oppo-
site result, holding that a grand jury subpoena is an order. The
124. United States v. Puntorieri, 379 F. Supp. 332 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
125. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Retail Credit Co., 357 F. Supp. 347 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 515
F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
126. 457 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
127. Id. at 971-72 (footnote omitted).
128. 460 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
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court reasoned that a grand jury is a judicial body having functions
independent of the prosecutorial arm of the government. The court
concluded that it would not be inconsistent with the purpose of
the FCRA to equate a grand jury subpoena with a court order,
since the purpose of the FCRA is "to prevent unreasonable or
careless invasions of privacy. '12 9 The court, however, recognized
that a grand jury subpoena is issued without the authorization of a
judge.130
Two years later, the same issue was addressed in the case of In
re Vaughn. sl The court opened its discussion by noting that the
people charged with the protection of personal information are un-
derstandably reluctant to risk violating disclosure laws. Under the
FCRA, consumer reporting agencies which violate the disclosure
restrictions may be subject to civil liability 3 2 and individuals who
violate the Act may be subject to criminal prosecution."' Simi-
larly, an individual who violates the Privacy Act may be subject to
criminal penalties.13 4
After refusing to join the courts in Credit Information and TRW
in the debate over the function of the grand jury, the Vaughn
court determined that a grand jury subpoena is not an order. The
court found a number of factors to be dispositive. First, citing Rule
17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3 ' the court found
"it significant that a subpoena is issued by the clerk, in blank, to
whomever requests one," 3' and that the clerk "exercises no discre-
tion, let alone judicial discretion, in issuing a subpoena. ' " 7 Second,
citing Stiles3 8 for support, the court recognized that courts may
quash a subpoena. 13 9 Third, the court noted the functional differ-
ence between a subpoena and an order as suggested by the Su-
129. Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
130. Id.
131. 496 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(n), (s) (1976).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(r) (1976).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)(1) (1976).
135. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
136. 496 F. Supp. at 1082.
137. Id.
138. See discussion in text beginning at note 37 supra.
139. 496 F. Supp. at 1082.
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preme Court case of Brown v. United States.140 Fourth, the court
recognized the inability of the subpoena process to protect the pri-
vacy of personal information:
The Court believes that the legislative purpose of protecting the
privacy of credit information would be frustrated unless the Court
allows the individuals on whom credit information is sought to re-
spond to such a motion. Indeed, the possibility for such parties to
respond to a motion for an order, absent where the government sim-
ply issues a subpoena, is another compelling reason for holding that
a subpoena is not an order. Accordingly, if the government moves
for an order compelling that which it seeks through the subpoena in
question here, it shall serve such motion upon those individuals
whose records are sought in the subpoena in question. 141
The government moved for reconsideration of the order quash-
ing the grand jury subpoena in In re Vaughn. In reaffirming its
original order, the court clarified and strengthened its original
rationale.
[T]he Court stated that requiring the prosecutor to obtain an order
would enhance the privacy of a consumer credit information by in-
voking the Court's processes at an earlier stage than if the grand
jury simply issued a subpoena which someone later moved to quash.
Requiring the prosecutor to move for an order would cause the pros-
ecutor to articulate the need for and relevancy of the information
sought. Further, as indicated in the previous order, requiring service
of the motion upon the person whose credit information is sought
would also promote the privacy purposes of the FCRA.142
The court also rebutted the government's argument that "the
shroud of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings"143 can re-
place the protection of the FCRA. The court concluded that while
in many instances the two protections seem duplicative, Congress
chose to enact an additional measure of protection for credit infor-
mation which would be very significant in instances where the
140. Id. (quoting Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49-50 (1959)).
141. Id. at 1083.
142. Id. (citation omitted).
143. Id.
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prosecutor's motion for disclosure is denied and as a result the in-
formation is not disclosed even to the prosecutor and grand jury. "
Finally, the court declared that basic principles of statutory con-
struction support, and perhaps even dictate, such a result.145 The
court held that the "plain and unambiguous" meaning of the term
"order" did not comprehend a subpoena.146 The decision and ratio-
nale of the court is itself "plain and unambiguous;" a subpoena is
not an "order of a court."
The FCRA is not the only law requiring a court order that has
been interpreted by the courts. Federal interpretation of a New
York statute is also instructive. The New York tax code provides,
in part:
Except in accordance with proper judicial order or as otherwise
provided by law, it shall be unlawful for the tax commission, any tax
commissioner ... to divulge or make known in any manner the
amount of income or any particulars set forth or disclosed in any
report or return required under this article .... 147
Relying upon decisions of the New York courts, 48 the New York
Department of Taxation and Finance attempted to challenge a
federal grand jury subpoena as not being a "proper judicial order"
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena for New York State Income Tax
Records. 49 Two questions confronting the district court were
whether a federal grand jury subpoena is a "proper judicial order"
within the meaning of New York Tax Law § 697(e) and, if it is not,
whether compliance with the subpoena is nonetheless mandatory
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion."' The court found that the grand jury subpoena at issue was
not a "proper judicial order," as defined by the New York courts,
but held that compliance with the subpoena was mandated by the
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. N.Y. TAX LAW § 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979) (emphasis added).
148. See, e.g., New York State Dep't of Tax v. New York State Dep't of Law, 44 N.Y.2d
575, 378 N.E.2d 110, 406 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1978).
149. 468 F. Supp. 575 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
150. Id. at 576.
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Supremacy Clause.151
In its dictum, the district court expressed its belief that compli-
ance with the subpoena would not subvert New York's interest in
safeguarding individual privacy because federal grand jury pro-
ceedings are conducted secretly.152 The court balanced the desire
on New York's part to encourage honest tax reporting by protect-
ing returns with the greater necessity of thorough grand jury inves-
tigations into violations of federal law.15 3 Pending a written show-
ing by federal prosecutors that the subpoenaed information is
relevant and necessary to the grand jury investigation,1 ' the court
ordered compliance with the subpoena.
On appeal by the New York Tax Department, the court held
that, in most instances, an order denying a motion to quash a
grand jury subpoena is not appealable. 55 Thus, the court refused
to consider the merits of New York's claim of privilege. However,
in its discussion of the inroads made into the general rule that a
pre-contempt disclosure order is not appealable, 15 the court dis-
cussed the Perlman doctrine: 57
Under the doctrine when a subpoena is addressed to a person who
has custody of material as to which another person has a privilege of
non-disclosure, the person who has the privilege may appeal a dis-
closure order immediately. The reason for allowing the appeal in
these circumstances is that the holder of the privilege has no power
to cause the custodian of the information to risk a contempt citation
for non-disclosure. Thus, denying the holder of the privilege the
right to appeal from the disclosure order "would practically defeat
the right to any review at all."15
151. Id. at 577-78.
152. Id. at 577.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 578 (footnote omitted).
155. New York Dep't of Taxation v. United States, 607 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1979). See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
156. 607 F.2d at 569.
157. Pernman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). For an account of the development of
the Perlman doctrine, see National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591
F.2d 174, 177-81 (2d Cir. 1979).
158. 607 F.2d at 570 (references, footnote omitted) (quoting Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940)).
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The Perlman doctrine, when raised in this context, recognizes that
the person to whom the information pertains has a privacy privi-
lege that is extremely difficult to exercise.
In discussing the functional differences between a subpoena and
a court order, most of these cases infer that the subpoena itself has
two phases or is bipartite. The bipartite nature of the subpoena is
established in the federal rules of criminal and civil procedure in
two forms. The first form, the "[m]ere issuance in discovery pro-
ceedings of a subpoena-which is always subject to the power of
the court to quash or limit,"159 was unsuccessfully relied upon in
Stiles. The civil rules give the court the power to issue protective
orders160 and quash subpoenas.""1 Likewise, the criminal rules per-
mit the courts to issue protective or modifying orders162 and quash
subpoenas.16 3 These rules give the courts latitude in denying, re-
159. 453 F. Supp. at 800.
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), which reads in part:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on mat-
ters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be
taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or
more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be
had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or
place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than
that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired
into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discov-
ery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that
a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be
disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously
file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as
directed by the court.
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
162. FED. R. Crum. P. 16(d)(1), which reads:
(1) Protective and Modifying Orders. Upon a sufficient showing the court may at
any time order that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or
make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may
permit the party to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written
statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting
relief following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the
appellate court in the event of an appeal.
163. FED. R. CiM. P. 17(c).
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stricting or deferring discovery by either party."" If the court were
actually involved in the framing and issuance of the original sub-
poenas the need for protective or modifying orders or motions to
quash would be minimized. However, the legislative history of Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure makes it clear that
"the parties themselves will accomplish discovery-no motion need
be filed and no court order is necessary. The court will intervene
only to resolve a dispute as to whether something is discoverable or
to issue a protective order.'"1 65
The second form in which the bipartite nature of the subpoena
is exposed is in the sanctions set forth in the rules for failure to
make discovery or comply with the order. 16 6 Again, the legislative
history is clear. "The Committee agrees that the parties should, to
the maximum possible extent, accomplish discovery themselves.
The court should become involved only when it is necessary to re-
solve a dispute or to issue an order pursuant to subdivision (d).$'167
Thus, it was the intention of the framers of the Federal Rules that
the courts would not become involved in the discovery or subpoena
process until after a conflict arose. This puts the courts into the
second phase of the bipartite process and recognizes the reality
that issuance of subpoenas is more an administrative formality
164. See Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 94-247, reprinted in
FEDERAL RULES (Crim. Proc.) 50 (West 1979).
165. Id.
166. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (motion for order compelling discovery), (b) (failure to
comply with order), and (d) (failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection). See also FED. R. CalM. P. 16(d)(2),
which reads:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of
the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems
just under the circumstances. The court may specify the time, place and manner of
making the discovery and inspection and may prescribe such terms and conditions as
are just.
and 17(g), which reads:
Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon
him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued or of
the court for the district in which it issued if it was issued by a United States
magistrate.
167. Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 94-247, reprinted in FED-
ERAL RuLs (Crim. Proc.) 50 (West 1979).
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than a judicial decision.
VII. WHY A SUBPOENA Is NOT A COURT ORDER
Over fifty years ago, Justice Louis Brandeis, in his famous dis-
sent in the case of Olmstead v. United States,168 set forth the basic
constitutional principle of individual privacy.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intel-
lect. . . . They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be
let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intru-
sion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
4th Amendment.169
President Richard Nixon, in his 1974 State of the Union speech to
Congress, addressed the need to protect individual privacy, which
ultimately became the Privacy Act of 1974.170
One of the basic rights we cherish most in America is the right of
privacy. With the advance of technology, that right has been in-
creasingly threatened. The problem is not simply one of setting ef-
fective curbs on invasions of privacy, but even more fundamentally
one of limiting the uses to which essentially private information is
put, and of recognizing the basic proprietary rights each individual
has in information concerning himself.
Privacy, of course, is not absolute; it may conflict, for example,
with the need to pursue justice. But where conflicts occur, an intelli-
gent balance must be struck.
One part of the current problem is that as technology has in-
creased the ability of government and private organizations to
gather and disseminate information about individuals, the safe-
guards needed to protect the privacy of individuals and communica-
tions have not kept pace. Another part of the problem is that clear
168. 227 U.S. 438 (1928).
169. Id. at 478.
170. State of the Union Message to Congress, January 30, 1974, reprinted in Congres-
sional Record, Jan. 30, 1974 (daily edition), p. H372.
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definitions and standards concerning the right of privacy have not
been developed and agreed upon.171
It is clear that the Privacy Act was designed to safeguard indi-
vidual personal privacy,172 a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution. 17 3 The right is safeguarded by two primary mecha-
nisms: (1) the citizen's power to determine what records containing
information about himself are disseminated, 1 4 and (2) the citizen's
power to prevent unauthorized dissemination. 7 5 This protection is
absolute; the government has no discretion.
Congress requires that no agency shall disclose personal informa-
tion without the subject's consent. The requirement is rigid. It pro-
hibits unconsented release by any means of communication, such
as a subpoena, to any person or agency, such as parties in litiga-
tion.1 76 Failure to abide by this prohibition can result in civil pen-
alties177 or criminal prosecution of the violating official.17 8 At least
one federal official, a former U.S. attorney, has been so
convicted.7
To aid in the conduct of legitimate and necessary business, the
Congress allows eleven exceptions to the strict requirments of sec-
tion (b) (conditions of disclosure). Exception (b)(11) is one of
these. As the OMB guidelines indicate, these exceptions are not
mandatory, but permissive.180 In other words, these are the maxi-
mum, not the minimum, limits of government disclosure.
As the bare legislative history of the Privacy Act indicates, the
171. Id. Perhaps ironically, a number of actions sanctioned by the Nixon White House
gave added momentum to privacy legislation: the break-in at the Democratic National Com-
mittee's headquarters, revelations of "White House enemies' lists," the break-in of the office
of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, the wiretapping of phones of government employees and
news reporters, and the surreptitious taping of White House meetings.
172. Privacy Act of 1974 § 2(b), 5 U.S.C. § 552a note (b) (1976).
173. Id. § 2(a)(4), 5 U.S.C. § 552a note (a)(4) (1976).
174. Id. § 2(b)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) note (b)(1) (1976).
175. Id. § 2(b)(2), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) note (b)(2) (1976).
176. Id. § 3(b), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976).
177. Id. § 3(g)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (1976).
178. Id. § 3(i)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)(1) (1976). See Rowe v. Tennessee, 431 F. Supp. 1257,
1264 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 609 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1979).
179. [1977] ATr'y GEN. REP. 84 (opinion of Douglas M. Gonzales).
180. OMB Guidelines, supra note 16, at 28,953.
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Senate considered an advance notification requirement so that the
person about whom information was sought could act to enjoin any
compulsory legal process or subpoena. 181 The absence of this clause
in the final legislation gives rise to two possible conclusions. First,
it may have been felt that the government was the appropriate in-
strumentality to protect personal privacy under exception (b)(11).
There is no guarantee, however, that the interests of the govern-
ment (the holder of the information) and the subject of the infor-
mation (the holder of the privacy privilege) will coincide.'82 It is
entirely possible that the government will view the release of infor-
mation as posing no danger to the subject and the subject will
never be aware of the release until actual harm comes to him. The
government is not the best arbitrator of this decision. This is the
underlying message of the Privacy Act.
Second, Congress may have believed that the courts, through the
legal process, would adequately protect the privacy of information.
This protection would be an absolute fiction if subpoenas were ac-
cepted as orders of the court under (b)(11), particularly since indi-
viduals would have no prior notice of releases. Subpoenas are not
really issued by the courts in anything remotely resembling a judi-
cial proceeding. 183 Rather, they are standardized forms issued in
blank and signed by the clerk before the blanks are filled in.'"
Subpoenas are not seen or reviewed by judges prior to their issue.
For this reason, subpoenas fail to provide any judicial safeguards
necessary under exception (b)(11).
The bipartite nature of the discovery process, between issuance
of a subpoena by a clerk and enforcement by a judge,185 empha-
sizes the differences between a subpoena and a court order. This
functional difference has been recognized by the Supreme Court. 8
181. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(g) (1974), reprinted in SoURCEBOOK ON PRIVACY,
supra note 8, at 97.
182. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
183. See In re Simon, 297 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1924); FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a); FED. R. Civ. P.
45(a).
184. See In re Vaughn, 496 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In re TRW, Inc., 400 F. Supp.
1007 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
185. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (1807) (Case No. 14,692d); Nixon v. Sirica,
487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
186. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49-50.
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This difference is also seen in the ability of the court to quash or
amend subpoenas. 1 7
Perhaps the best argument against considering a subpoena a
court order was spelled out in In re Vaughn.188 The parallel be-
tween (b)(11) and 15 U.S.C. 1681b(1) is remarkable. The Fair
Credit Reporting Act, like the Privacy Act, is designed to insure a
respect for the individual's right of privacy by the holder of per-
sonal information. This protection does not surplant or cannot be
surplanted by other protections, such as grand jury secrecy. It is a
unique safeguard of its own.
The Stiles decision, as sparse as it is, gives the best guidance
available on what will constitute a court order for the purpose of
(b)(11). "Section 552a(b)(11) provides for those cases in which, for
compelling reasons, the court specifically directs that a record be
disclosed." 18 9 Anything less would fail to protect the valuable right
of privacy. "[]t is clear that the Privacy Act will prevent disclo-
sure . . . unless the court specifically orders [subpoenaed docu-
ments] produced pursuant to section 552a(b)(11)." 90 Subpoenas
do not qualify.
187. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1), 17(e); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), 34(b).
188. 496 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
189. 453 F. Supp. 798, 800 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
190. Id.
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